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Accounting Enforcement’s Determinants—A Global Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the national characteristics of 
culture, religion and political factionalization are associated with the strength of 
accounting enforcement. The study uses data on percentages of religious adherents in a 
sample nation, the Hofstede cultural dimensions and political factionalization as key 
independent variables. This study also controls for national legal code (e.g., Common 
Law or Civic Code) and market liquidity.  It uses factor analysis to generate factor scores 
from the data. These factor scores are then used as the independent variables. The 
dependent variable, accounting enforcement, is drawn from Brown, Preiato and Tarca 
(2014). The findings demonstrate that these national characteristics are strongly 
associated with national accounting regulatory enforcement.  The implications of this 
research are that national characteristics should be taken into account in considering the 
impact of accounting standards on accounting comparability across nations.   The 
limitation of this study is that, like much international research, the sample size is limited, 
here to 42 nations. This study provides an important contribution to the literature by 
helping establish that national characteristics do affect accounting enforcement efforts 
cross-nationally.  This helps researchers and regulators better understand whether 
international standards can provide the link in comparability across nations that 
proponents are seeking. It does so by focusing on the variation in enforcement across 
nations rather than on the standards themselves. 
KEYWORDS:  Accounting Enforcement, Accounting Quality, Culture, Religion, 
Political Factionalization,  Regulation 
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Accounting Enforcement’s Determinants—A Global Study 
One of the central goals of having a global set of financial reporting standards is 
to create a more cohesive and comparable international financial reporting environment.1 
In fact, the call for global reporting standards has been ongoing since the mid-20th 
century, with the SEC reiterating its commitment to a global set of accounting standards 
in 2010 and beyond.2  However, it remains unclear whether global standards themselves 
are an achievable goal, and further, whether these standards would provide the cohesive 
and comparable financial reporting desired (Leuz, 2010). Recent events also point to a 
trend of pushback against globalization.  These events include the “Brexit” vote in the 
United Kingdom, France’s “Frexit” movement’s growth, the rise of the Alternatives for 
Germany Party (AfD), and rising nationalistic, populist movements in the United States 
and elsewhere. This trend has caught the attention of financial and political elites cross-
nationally, fueling arguments that more attention should be paid to national 
characteristics and national welfare as opposed to an elite preference towards 
globalization (e.g. Summers 2016; King 2016).   
Although there has been a push for globalization of accounting standards, Gillis, 
Petty and Suddaby (2014) note that little research has been done on the transnational 
regulation of accounting, and they argue that it is important to understand the drivers of 
such regulation.  BPT (2014) and Preiato, Brown and Tarca (2015) address transnational 
regulation of accounting by studying the enforcement of accounting standards, noting that 
                                                 
1 http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-IASB.aspx 
2 http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156304264 
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enforcement of regulation varies between nations and has significant impacts on 
uncertainty in the financial markets.  The BPT (2014) and PBT (2015) studies 
demonstrate that the accounting enforcement index that they developed impacts 
accounting quality of nations in their sample, as measured in their studies. However, no 
studies have looked at the potential drivers of accounting standards enforcement in a 
multi-national setting.  This paper fills this gap in the literature.  By doing so, this study 
adds important findings to the discussion of whether it is reasonable to expect similar 
enforcement of accounting standards across nations, and provides researchers with an 
important control for studies exploring international accounting standards.   
Studying accounting standards enforcement is particularly important with the 
widespread adoption of IFRS and other local accounting standards.  Although there have 
been many studies evaluating IFRS adoption, they do not take into consideration, to any 
great extent, the operating environment of the countries adopting these standards and how 
this affects enforcement, and ultimately the quality and comparability of financial 
statements across nations. Without comparable enforcement, the same type of standards 
“on paper” can easily lead to differing financial reporting results.  Consider IFRS 13, 
which permits reporting of certain assets at fair value.  It uses a variety of hierarchical 
measurement techniques.  In a country with weak enforcement, corporations may have 
much latitude to report assets at the value most advantageous to them, whereas in a 
country with strong enforcement, corporations may not have such latitude.  It would seem 
as if the same standards should result in the same accounting, but, given different levels 
of enforcement, it may not.  Thus, when utilizing judgment required by many IFRS 
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standards, strong enforcement would appear necessary to ensure maximum 
comparability.  
This paper sheds light on the relationship between national characteristics and the 
level of regulatory enforcement. This paper specifically identifies legal origin, culture, 
religion, and market development following Leuz (2010).  It also includes a political 
factor, political factionalization of the elite. This has been missing from prior literature.  
While Leuz (2010) incorporates several important characteristics that encompass a 
nation, he does not account for political factions, which is likely to influence regulation. 
Additionally, Leuz (2010) looks at culture as a package of attributes making it difficult to 
draw conclusions.  This paper breaks down cultural attributes to enable a specific 
understanding of which are associated with accounting regulation.   It focuses specifically 
on religion and other cultural variables found to be associated with societal behaviors and 
with regulation (e.g. Duong, Kang, and Salter 2016; Cowperthwaite 2010).  Religion and 
culture are very powerful forces affecting human behavior (KLP, 2014).  In doing this 
analysis, this study provides a more focused lens into factors associated with accounting 
regulation. 
Global reporting standards are intended to create financial reporting that is 
consistent across nations.  However, from a functionalist perspective, which views 
aspects of a society as connected so that they mutually influence each other, national 
characteristics are likely to influence how accounting standards are implemented and 
further how they are enforced.  In fact, the practice of law, medicine and accounting, 
have all been found to differ between nations (see, for example, La Porta, Lopez-De-
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Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998; McPherson 1989; Evans, Baskerville and Nara 2015; 
Nabar & Boonlert-U-Thai 2007).  
This study focuses on the influences of national characteristics on enforcement3 of 
accounting standards for 42 nations.  The results of this study show that a country’s 
religious environment, national culture, political environment, legal origin, and financial 
market liquidity are all associated with the level of accounting enforcement in the sample 
nations. This is an important contribution to the literature on the relationship between 
culture and regulation because it will help regulators understand whether adjustments to 
local regulation will have the desired effect of making accounting standards more 
uniform.  Further it will help regulators create enforcement legislation that may be more 
useful when considering specific cultural nuances. This contribution is particularly 
important given the current political climate in which Western alliances have been facing 
increasing stress, where it is likely that national characteristics will become even more 
pronounced and important in regulation and enforcement.  
These results should also be of interest to standard setters, who are concerned 
with factors that influence financial statement quality and comparability, and to 
researchers who want to understand the nexus between accounting standards, accounting 
standards enforcement, and the financial statements themselves. They should also provide 
an understanding of how national characteristics may influence other globalization 
efforts. Section II provides an extensive literature review and hypothesis development, 
                                                 
3 Enforcement represents enforcement infrastructures (also called regimes here) recommended by the 
European Commission (2000) for the enforcement of accounting standards, captured in an index created by 
BPT (2014). 
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Section III discusses the sample and methodology, Section IV presents a discussion of 
results, and Section V provides concluding remarks. 
   
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This study looks at the potential drivers of accounting enforcement.  This section 
reviews both empirical and theoretical literature that guides the choice of factors used in 
the current study.  Then hypotheses based on this prior literature are developed. 
A recent theoretical study by KLP (2014) postulates auditing enforcement 
regimes are a function of many national cultural characteristics (e.g., Hofstede, 2001), as 
well as of religion, source of auditing and accounting standards, and legal code origin.  
KLP notes that there may be systematic differences in the implementation of common 
regulations based on variation in national regulatory regimes, a point noted by Leuz 
(2010) as well. Kleinman and Lin (2017) provided empirical evidence supporting this 
theory. However, their study focuses on the influence of national characteristics on 
auditing regulatory enforcement and not accounting regulatory enforcement.  It is 
important to study the relationship of national characteristics to accounting standards 
enforcement because accounting standards provide guidelines for corporate reporting and 
therefore the enforcement of these standards provide a window into the rigor with which 
corporate financial statements are prepared within a nation.  Auditing standards, on the 
other hand, provide oversight to the audit professionals, with the auditors acting as an 
independent check on corporate financial reporting.  The enforcement of auditing 
standards provides a window into the environment within which the audit firms exist. 
ACCOUNTING ENFORCEMENT’S DETERMINANTS—A GLOBAL STUDY                  7 
 
  
 
Leuz (2010) studies the relationship between national characteristics and financial 
market regulation by clustering nations into groups by characteristics that he deemed to 
represent their culture. Characteristics including legal origin, cultural region, market 
development and country wealth are used as a basis for determining cluster membership 
when associating these characteristics with financial market regulation, including 
securities offering disclosure requirements, liability standards of directors, distributors 
and accountants, public enforcement of securities regulation and shareholder rights.  His 
findings indicate several distinct clusters, and based on these findings, he argued that 
effective international regulation and enforced comparability of financial statements is 
unlikely without special arrangements.  Although this study addresses the issue of 
national characteristics and their effect on financial market regulation, it is not clear from 
his study which specific cultural characteristics influence the regulation decision because 
he uses very broad indices and cluster analysis. Leuz (2010) also reports wide variation 
within his clusters but does not identify the source of this variation. In comparison, this 
study seeks to understand which specific cultural, religious, and political variables are 
related to regulation.  In addition, this study looks at regulation differently, using an 
accounting enforcement index developed by BPT (2014).  It calculates an accounting 
enforcement activity score for 52 nations from 2002 to 2008. BPT (2014, p. 1) note that 
their auditing and accounting enforcement indices “have additional explanatory power 
(over more general legal proxies) for country-level measures of economic and market 
activity, financial transparency and earnings management.” This index is more relevant to 
an accounting study than the measures used by Leuz, which focus broadly on financial 
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markets.  This study uses a combination of regression and factor analysis to look directly 
at the relationship between each country’s enforcement efforts, and its religious, cultural 
and political environment, in contrast to Leuz’ approach. 
Other literature has also shown strong support for the notion that institutional 
differences in infrastructure, culture, legal requirements, as well as socio-economic and 
political systems, may lead to non-comparable accounting figures despite similar 
accounting standards (Cascino and Gassen 2015; Gordon, Greiner, Kohlbeck, Lin and 
Skaife 2013; Leuz, 2010; Ball et al. 2003; Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; Nabar & Boonlert-
U-Thai 2007).4 Gordon et al (2013) note, for example, that the development of 
accounting standards and their enforcement is likely influenced by a complex set of 
variables.  
Many other studies have found a relationship between national characteristics and 
how they influence financial reporting quality (e.g. Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and 
Riedl 2010, a result supported analytically by Ball 2001; Ball et al 2003)., However, 
these research studies have focused most frequently on legal and political systems.  
Results show that markets in countries operating under code law systems had less of a 
reaction to IFRS adoption than those operating under common law systems, indicating 
that participants in code law systems expected lower financial reporting value from IFRS 
adoption than participants in common law systems (e.g., Ball et al., 2003). Soderstrom 
and Sun (2007) conducted an extensive literature review and note that legal (e.g., code 
                                                 
4 Such arguments are in line with the economic sociology approach of Granovetter (2017).  Granovetter 
argues that human behavior and their institutions are the outcome of the interactions between individuals, 
institutions, and the social, economic, political, religious and cultural environments within which they are 
embedded.  Fligstein & McAdam (2012) present a theory of fields, providing a mechanism by which 
institutional and other development may occur. 
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law versus common law) and political factors such as government corruption and the 
threat of expropriation may also affect accounting quality.   
Although prior literature has addressed the relationship between national 
characteristics and regulation broadly, no studies have looked at the relationship between 
a comprehensive model of specific national characteristics and accounting standards 
enforcement. It is important to look at this relationship because other literature finds that 
social order is a partial function of such characteristics (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Hallett and Ventresca 2006; Friedland 2009; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 2007). 
Additionally, while Leuz (2010) finds that characteristics of countries cluster into 
meaningful segments, and that segment membership did have an impact on enforcement, 
his approach does not allow a breakdown of particular variable influences upon the 
regulatory enforcement choice, a choice that, he notes, varies a great deal between 
nations in the same segment in his own sample.  Even in very embedded stews, it is 
important to know which ingredients best affect the flavor. 
 Next, relevant literature in regard to culture, religion and political factionalization 
is reviewed.     
 
Culture 
Literature looking at the influence of culture on various matters of interest 
frequently utilizes cultural dimensions identified and defined by Hofstede (1980, 1983, 
1984 pp. 83-84) and his subsequent works.  This literature often connects culture with 
other influences.  According to Richardson (2007), Hofstede (1980) argues that his 
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cultural framework is impacted by external influences (e.g. natural events, investment, 
and conquest).  Such influences affect ecological factors including history, economics 
and demographics, which in turn affect Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  These cultural 
dimensions potentially impact such institutions as religion, political, legal and education 
systems.  The institutions, of course, further affect the cultural dimensions and the 
aforesaid ecological factors.  
This characterization is consistent with Granovetter (2017) and Fligstein and 
McAdam (2012).  Karaibrahimoglu and Cangarli (2016), find a moderating effect of 
culture on the relationship between the strength of auditing standards and firms’ ethical 
behaviors.  Karaibrahimoglu and Cangarli (2016) agree with Granovetter on the 
important impact of culture and other institutional factors. Accordingly, ethics and 
regulation may be seen as alternatives to each other but not as mutua lly exclusive means 
of controlling the financial reporting behavior of corporations.  Ethics and what are 
considered ethical violations are influenced by culture, as are the consequences of such 
behavior.  Since the impact of conscience on behavior is uncertain, in that conscience 
speaks to different people in different ways, understanding culture’s relationship to 
regulation and behavior is important.   
Minnis & Shroff (2017, p. 5) explore determinants of financial regulation 
(specifically on financial disclosure and auditing reports, not standard setting), finding 
that there is a “…rich heterogeneity across countries in terms of both reporting 
differences and institutional differences.”  Minnis and Shroff (2017, p. 3) note that “the 
extent to which each of the benefits and costs weighs into a country’s culture and 
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institutional framework is likely to shape the country’s level of regulation (Leuz 2010).”  
Because of the strong connection between culture and its influence on consequences, it is 
important to include cultural variables here. 
Hofstede identifies and defines significant societal values to include 
Individualism (versus Collectivism), Power Distance (Large versus Small), Uncertainty 
Avoidance (Strong versus Weak), Masculinity (versus Femininity), Long-term 
Orientation (versus Short-term Normative Orientation), and Indulgence (versus 
Restraint).   Richardson (2007) uses these cultural dimensions and finds that 
individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance were related to ‘tax values’ in a 
sample of 43 nations, but does not find significance for masculinity. Studies by 
Cowperthwaite 2010; Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo 2014 find similar results.  Nabar & 
Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) also find that a nation’s uncertainty avoidance influences 
earnings management. Other studies have demonstrated the relevance of Hofstede’s 
culture concepts to the accounting profession (e.g. Gray 1988; Doupnik and Tsakumis 
2004). Further, Hofstede’s (2001) measures of culture are used here because the vast 
majority of culture research in management and international business is built on these 
scores (e.g., Tosi and Greckhamer 2004; Han, Kang, Salter and Yoo 2010), as well as 
culture research in finance according to Reuter (2011).  Readings in the accounting 
literature itself support the notion that Hofstede’s measure is the most widely-such used 
measure in accounting research.   Further, Voss (2012) does a head-to-head comparison 
of Hofstede’s constructs to the House et al. (2004) GLOBE culture measure, thought by 
some to be a more current measure, and finds that Hofstede’s formulations are superior.   
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 Cowperthwaite (2010) notes that there is increasing evidence that national 
cultural traits influence all aspects of its citizens’ lives, including social interactions, 
dealing with power inequality, and response to uncertainty. He finds from his 
professional experience that auditing is no exception. Fisman and Miguel (2007) provide 
additional direct evidence on the influence that cultural norms and legal enforcement play 
with regard to corruption patterns.  Orij (2010), using a sample of 600 firms drawn from 
22 nations, found that national culture influenced corporate social responsibility reporting 
levels.   
Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez & Gibson (2005, p. 362; see also Granovetter, 
2017) note that “culture is often viewed as a multi-level construct that consists of various 
levels nested within each other from the most macro-level of a global culture, through 
national cultures, organizational cultures, group cultures, and cultural values that are 
represented in the self at the individual level.” This nesting effect argues against Leuz’s 
(2010) division of the world into seven geographic sectors, sectors which conflate 
culture, legal code, and other characteristics. Leung et al.’s statements about culture as a 
multi- level construct intimates that much understanding may be lost with higher and 
higher levels of aggregation. Thus use of national data will provide more important 
insight into the operation of culture on accounting regulatory enforcement choices, 
choices that are made at the national level, than will Leuz’s (2010) aggregation of nations 
into geographic sectors.  While Oh, Pieper and Gerhart (2010) note that cultural 
variations exist within nations (see also Granovetter, 2017; Fligstein and McAdam, 
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2012), this does not disturb this effort since national regulatory efforts are the most 
disaggregated level of measurement possible.  
Culture is important because, as Williamson (2000: cited by Lievenbruck and 
Schmid,2014)) notes, it impacts decision-making.  Further, since culture is embedded in 
the national context, it changes very slowly (e.g., Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014; Davis 
and Williamson, 2016).  According to Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014; p. 94), 
Williamson’s schema for the impact of culture on decision-making argues that “culture 
influences decision making in two ways.  First, culture shapes the formal institutional 
environment in a country…. [The] second, direct way in which culture influences 
decision making: via informal rules and standards.” North (1991; cited in Lievenbruck 
and Schmid, 2014) notes that formal constraints (e.g., laws) on behavior are inadequate in 
themselves, but require culture-based constraints as an assist to such formal structures as 
the law.  Indeed, the author notes, culture may shape the formal constraints themselves.     
It is important, then, to understand the relationship of culture to formal constraints, here 
expressed as regulations over accounting practice.  Given the extant literature indicating 
the importance of culture with respect to behavior, and following prior research that 
particularly focuses on certain of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the following variables 
have been selected for study here:  Individualism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance.    
Hofstede’s first societal value, Individualism, refers to the limited 
interdependence of a society within which individuals tend to take care of only 
themselves and their immediate families (Hofstede 1984, 2001).  This is in direct contrast 
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to Collectivism, which represents a tightly knit community where relatives and clan 
members are expected to take care of each other in exchange for complete loyalty (see 
also Franke, Hofstede and Bond 1991).  Individualism may lead to stronger accounting 
enforcement because individuals are all independently looking out for their own best 
interests and therefore there is a need for monitoring (e.g., Hofstede, Hofstede, and 
Minkov, 2010). In contrast, Davis and Williamson (2016) found that highly 
individualistic countries tended to have lighter regulation of business entry than did less 
individualistic countries. This effect was stronger in nations with a greater democratic 
tradition and those having a common law tradition. 
Alternatively, a collectivist culture is one in which citizens work together as a 
group, and this may create a strong alliance towards or against regulations and the 
enforcement of said regulations.  Collectivist culture may serve to mitigate the need for 
regulation because internal pressures within society may lead to the desired behavior 
without regulation.  On the other hand, it may push groups against adopting norms for 
compliance with rules and therefore regulation may be needed to constrict group behavior 
so as to force compliance with the ends that the regulation seeks to bring about.  Thus, 
independence may pull regulation in one direction and collectivism may pull it in 
another.  The literature supports the impact of culture, including 
independence/collectivism on behavior.  Accordingly, the following hypothesis is 
offered.     
H1: A country’s degree of Individualism (IND) will be associated with its 
accounting regulatory enforcement. 
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The second societal value, Power Distance, refers to the way a society manages 
inequalities among members of the society when such inequalities occur (Hofstede 1984).  
People in societies with large Power Distance are more accepting of hierarchal order and 
their place in the hierarchy and are unlikely to question this.  People in societies with 
small Power Distance are interested in equal power and would question and demand 
justification for inequalities in power.  Therefore, where small Power Distance is a 
dominant culture, stronger enforcement of regulations is more likely to ensure that 
members of the societies are equally protected. Individuals in greater power distance 
societies may be more accepting of a lack of effective regulation, resulting in less 
pressure for regulation.   
On the other hand, in greater power distance societies, regulation might be seen as 
a necessary concomitant of social justice, in which the elite themselves impose regulation 
to at least protect themselves from informational predation by other members of the elite 
when transacting commercial transactions, including acquisition of other companies’ 
equity.  That is, different members of the elite may also suffer from informational 
insufficiency about proposed transactions.  While these powerful elites may possess the 
resources to gather information on proposed acquisition targets, etc., doing so on any 
wide scale may prove enormously expensive.  Enlisting the power of the state, through 
regulation, may ease transactional costs that occur in transactions among the elites.  The 
following hypothesis is offered.   
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H2:  The degree of Power Distance will be associated with accounting regulatory 
enforcement. 
 
The third societal value, Uncertainty Avoidance, refers to the way the society 
reacts to uncertainty, and the degree to which they feel uncomfortable with ambiguity 
(Hofstede, 1984).  A society with strong Uncertainty Avoidance would have a strict code 
of behavior and be intolerant of those defying that code of behavior because such 
defiance raises questions about the environment within which people live, whether 
financial or otherwise.  Thus, environments that are more ambiguous raise the anxieties 
of those within that environment.  Presumably those who are more uncertainty avoidant 
will experience more distress from such rule-breaking or disparate behaviors. A society 
with weak Uncertainty Avoidance on the other hand would be more relaxed and tolerant 
of those with ideas in defiance of the societal principles or norms of behavior, including 
behavior within the financial and accounting fields.   
A country with a strong inclination to avoid uncertainty could, on the one hand, 
be more likely to strongly enforce accounting regulation because not doing so could lead 
to more uncertainty with accounting results and the interpretation of information.  
However, it could on the other hand lead to inappropriate enforcement, whereby 
whatever is initially enforced becomes the overriding focus of enforcement efforts, even 
if it is an inappropriate or inefficient regulatory measure.  As has been said, original 
source unknown, the government that can give you everything you want can take away 
everything you have.  Moreover, since people in low Uncertainty Avoidance societies 
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have greater tolerance of uncertainty, they are more open to reforms and changes when 
such need arises.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is offered: 
 
H3: The degree of Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) will be associated with accounting 
regulatory enforcement. 
 
Factionalized Elites  
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions capture important aspect of national environment..  
The political environment is also likely to be related to behavior at the national level.  
Hillman and Keim (1995) propose a theoretical framework for understanding the way 
that governments and businesses operate and intersect, acknowledging that in addition to 
formal roles and legal constraints within a country, there are also informal rules and 
constraints set by societal norms and organizational culture.  All of these intersect to 
create within each country a unique political environment that affects the efficiency and 
functioning of the societal activities. In other words, in addition to Power Distance and 
hierarchical order, there are also factions that may emerge within a society, based on such 
roles.  These dueling political groups within a society are known as factionalized elites.  
Although they do not necessarily represent a hierarchical division, they do nonetheless 
represent a political division in society that may war to push/pull the society in different 
directions on matters of interest.   
It is unclear whether such divisions foster a stronger accounting regulation 
enforcement environment.  On the one hand, a hierarchal society could provide a 
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circumstance where the higher status members are able to manipulate the regulatory 
environment, resulting in a weaker enforcement effort (Fukuyama 2014a, b).  On the 
other hand, it could allow those higher status members to suggest a more efficient 
enforcement environment wherein the most members are provided with the most 
effective regulation and enforcement.  Adding to this, factionalized elites could provide 
more accountability in a society due to the dissonance within, or it could provide for a 
smaller enforcement effort due to instability within the government as a result of such 
groups.    
The presence of factionalized elites may make it cost effective for the elites to 
rely on government or enforcement regimes external to themselves to take on the task of 
regulation in that such a socialized system of providing accounting enforcement takes the 
burden of private enforcement off the elites.  With such a system, the different factions 
within the elite could rely on effective government (or other) enforcement efforts to help 
ensure the quality of accounting in firms that one faction of the elite or the other wishes 
to buy from the other.  This stands in contrast to having the purchasing faction engage in 
its own investigative activity with respect to the quality of the acquisition target’s 
accounting.  A unified, or otherwise monolithic elite, in contrast, may see little use in 
accounting enforcement in that the unified elite may share accurate financial information 
amongst themselves, and may not want enforcement of high quality financial accounting 
information to be made available to non-elite actors who may be interested in investing, 
wealth redistribution or tax law enforcement.5   
                                                 
5 The Fund for Peace, which provides this study’s measure of factionalized elites, defines factionalized 
elites here:  http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/c2/. 
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In a related vein, Ali and Hwang (2000) find that countries with heavy reliance on 
government standard setters rather than private sector standard-setters place less reliance 
on published financial reports, likely due to the focus on regulatory standards at the 
expense of standards demanded by investors.  Government standard setters can bring to 
bear the full power of the government on those noncompliant with government standards 
without invoking an intermediate mechanism (e.g., court-based activity) that may be both 
more costly, less efficient and less timely than a socialized system, under the aegis of the 
government. 
Given the values stated above and the uncertainty about how it might impact the 
enforcement of accounting regulation, the following hypothesis is offered: 
 
H4:  The presence of Factionalized Elites will be associated with accounting 
regulatory enforcement. 
 
Religion and Religiosity 
Although culture and political environment may be powerful national forces 
related to national regulation, religion has also long been argued to be a very powerful 
force affecting human behavior (e.g., KLP, 2014; Kleinman and Lin, 2017).  Durkheim 
(1995; cited in Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) argues that religion is important in that 
through it, people have a better understanding of their place and a feeling of being 
situated in the world that reduces the anxieties of existence.  As such, Fligstein and 
McAdam (2012; p. 56) state, “religion provide(s) a sanctified affirmation and expression 
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of the collective.”    Further, Fligstein and McAdam (2012; p. 58) note, religion embeds 
“the individual in a system of socially constructed meanings that substitutes the ‘inner 
view’ for the alienating aspects of the ‘outer’ perspective.”  In doing these things, religion 
allows individuals to feel as if they were part of a greater whole.   
Saroglu and Cohen (2011; p. 1311) argue that “religion refers to all kinds of 
behaviors humans do in reference to what they think is a transcendent reality; culture 
refers to all psychological characteristics that distinguish natural (nonexperimental) 
groups.”  Violating perceived religious injunctions, therefore, should be anxiety-arousing 
amongst the faithful.  Religion and its diktat provide guidance on behavior, whether 
narrowly defined, as in cleanliness rites, or very broadly defined, as in the Ten 
Commandments in the Judeo-Christian tradition.6  Maimonides (1956: 314-315) 
expressed the social function of religion well when he wrote that,  
“Scripture … demands belief in certain truths, the belief in which is indispensable 
in regulating our social relations;  such is the belief that God is angry with those 
who disobey him...In some cases the law contains a truth which is itself the only 
object of that law...In other cases, that truth is only the means of securing the 
removal of injustice, or the acquisition of good morals; such is the belief that God 
is angry with those who oppress their fellowmen...or the belief that God hears the 
crying of the oppressed…” 
Religion acts beyond the individual, to the group in which he/she is embedded.  
The power of religion is evident in its ability to foster hostility between groups, often 
                                                 
6 Hecht (2003) provides an extensive, historical review of the role that religion plays as a reinforcer of 
desirable social behavior across centuries, cultures and continents. 
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leading to war (e.g., Kissinger, 1994; Durant and Durant, 1968).  If people are willing to 
arm themselves and march off to slaughter in the name of their God, they may be willing 
to undertake other behaviors as well, including engaging in honest dealing.   
Durkheim and others lay out strong reasons why religion has often been such a 
strong motivator of behavior:  religion serves as an important tool for reducing the 
anxieties of existence that humankind faces, doing so by placing placing individuals in a 
broader context—as noted above. There is a tension, though, between the individual qua 
individual and the individual as one amongst the collective.  Since individuals can engage 
in individual action to achieve individual ends, then regulation may be unnecessary if that 
avenue is fruitful.  Doing so, however, leaves the doer bearing the burden of the chase, a 
burden that may be beyond his/her capacity or undesirable for other reasons—for 
example, why bear the burdens for freeloaders who share in the benefits of one’s activity 
without paying the pain?  While different degrees of what is at stake may result in 
different outcomes, collective action spreads the burden amongst the entire interested 
class.  While one may believe one’s own fealty to the faith is sufficient to forfend bad 
behavior on one’s own part, perhaps it is not enough on the part of others.  Regulation, 
therefor, serves to enforce right behavior on others.   
Another reason why religion is important in this study is the purported association 
between religion and morality.  Specifically, must people believe in a deity in order to 
behave morally, or are religion and morality distinct and separate things (e.g., 
Maimonides, 1956; Hecht, 2003)?  As McKay and Whitehouse (2015) note, this question 
is of ancient vintage, going back at least to the Platonic dialogue Euthyphro (Plato, 1997). 
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If religion is important to be engaged morally, then, in nations with a population that 
identifies with religion perhaps regulation would be unimportant.  But then, as Mathras et 
al. (2017) point out, religions differ amongst themselves on various dimensions.   
Klaubert (2010, p. 2) cites Guiso et al. (2003) as finding that “religious people, among 
others, are less willing to break the law, believe more in the fairness of the market and 
have less progressive attitudes towards working women.”  But then, also as Klaubert 
(2010, p. 2) notes, “large deviations often exist during the translation of values and 
beliefs into concrete actions and behavior.”  Beliefs indeed need not call forth specific 
behaviors.7 To the extent that this is understood popularly, an argument exists why even 
strongly religious communities may favor behavioral regulation. 
A variety of studies have found that religion shapes institutional behavior, popular 
perceptions, and accounting practices.8  Mensah (2014), for example, while controlling 
for various economic and political variables in his sample of nations, found that religion 
plays a role in perceptions of corruption. Specifically, he finds that the percentage of 
national population adhering to the Protestant, Buddhist and Hindu religions was 
negatively associated with the perception of corruption.  In contrast, the percentages of 
the population adhering to other Christian religions, Islam and other religions or not 
adhering to a religion were associated with greater perceptions of corruption.  Einolf 
(2011) also argues that religion plays an important role in shaping behavior.   One can 
argue that the presence of corruption is an important factor in evaluating enforcement 
                                                 
7  In addition, there is the argument in Christianity between those who argue that faith alone will save (e.g., 
Rom 3:20-22; Gal 2:16) and the importance of good works, whether to be saved or at least perhaps as an 
indication that one is predestined to be saved.   
8 Whether religion affects individual ethical behavior, however, is a different concern (Shariff, 2015).  
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regulation.   
La Porta et al. (1999) present evidence that countries having higher population 
percentages of Catholics or Muslims suffered from poorer government performance. In a 
different but related vein, Stulz and Williamson (2003) compared the impact of religion 
on creditor rights and accounting standards enforcement with that of other predictors, 
including the country’s openness to international trade, its language, per capita income or 
its legal system.  They reported that religion was a better predictor than openness to 
international trade.  Religion, therefore, influenced both policy making and the 
establishment of laws.  Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) also argue that religion plays a 
role in behavior, specifically that of earnings management.   They find that Catholicism, 
Buddhism, Protestantism and Islam were not related to earnings management.  This gives 
rise to this hypothesis. 
H5:  Religious affiliation will be associated with accounting regulatory 
enforcement. 
 
Although religious affiliation captures a nation’s religious composition, it does 
not take into account the importance of such religions to its inhabitants.  Religious 
proscriptions against certain behaviors could influence individuals who adhere to that 
religion to forebear engaging in those behaviors (e.g., Maimonides, 1956).  That said, 
though, individuals might have beliefs without behavioral consequences.  That is, they 
might steal even if a fundamental tenet of the religion to which they adhere proscribes 
theft. Some nations might work hard at building institutions to enforce religious 
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proscriptions, while others might not, with the latter perhaps relying on individual 
internalization of the religious value against, say, theft. Commonplace observations 
reveal that some people express adherence to religious precepts more strongly than 
others.  Religious observance differs as does the willingness to expose oneself to 
additional information about what is religiously required and to act on the perceived 
religious requirements (e.g., Klaubert 2010).   
Observance, though, may reflect only a superficial attempt to conform to 
community norms.  That is, there may be no underlying fealty to the moral norms of the 
faith.  Or, observance may for others be a true reflection of underlying beliefs and fealty. 
To some people then, religion is more important than it is to others, and that felt 
importance is likely to affect each individual’s behaviors (see, for example, Hess 2012, 
Hilary and Hui 2009 and Durant and Durant 1968; Mathras et al., 2017).   
 Mathras et al. (2017) note that religious values may increase individuals’ self-
control, willingness to check selfish impulses, and willingness to work for long-term 
goals.  Hess (2012) reported that individuals living in locales with stronger religious 
norms had stronger credit quality than individuals in locales with weaker religious norms. 
Mathras et al. (2017) reports that religious affiliation gives rise to feelings of belonging to 
a community.  As such, the norms of the community grow stronger as the felt claims of 
the community on the individual within it grow greater.  Thus the power of norms would 
be greater as well.   
McGuire, Omer and Sharp (2012) studied the association of religion and financial 
reporting behavior in the U.S.  They find that firms headquartered in areas with strong 
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religious social norms generally have fewer cases of financial reporting irregularities and 
are associated with lower accounting risk.  Religious influence, therefore, seems to work 
against enactment of unethical behaviors (see also Maimonides, 1956).  Mathras et al.  
(2017), note that different religions place different emphases on who may forgive 
offenses and which infractions can be forgiven.  Further, Mathras et al. (2017;  p. 305) 
note, “the stronger good-evil divisions in Western religions (but less so in Eastern 
religions) leads to a heavier insistence on personally avoiding evil and punishing evil-
doers.”  Different religions may rely more on conscience as a constraint, versus external 
sanction as a constraint.  The distinction is important since regulation, by definition, is an 
external constraint.   
Accordingly, the relationship of felt importance of religion to accounting 
regulatory enforcement is tested.  It is possible that greater felt importance of religion is 
more likely to result in a feeling that greater regulatory enforcement is necessary to 
ensure that others behave in accordance with religious, ethical and moral precepts, as 
reflected in the honesty of the financial statements.  Conversely, it is possible that 
societies in which religion is felt to be of greater importance may feel that greater 
accounting regulatory enforcement effort is not needed because other individuals will 
almost automatically follow religious precepts of ethical and moral behavior.  
Accordingly, this study tests the association of the importance ascribed to religion by 
individuals and levels of regulatory enforcement.  The following hypothesis is offered:  
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H6:  Religious importance will be associated with accounting regulatory 
enforcement. 
Sample and Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, this study uses the accounting enforcement index created 
by BPT (2014).  This index measures accounting enforcement efforts using an 
international sample.  BPT (2014) argue that using previous “rule of law” proxies (e.g. 
Leuz 2010; La Porta et al. 1998) to measure regulatory effects on accounting 
enforcements was not enough.  Previous regulation and enforcement proxies were not 
able to capture the specific accounting enforcement activities that took place in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley period. BPT (2014; p. 3) defines enforcement as the “the activities 
undertaken by independent bodies (monitoring, reviewing, educating and sanctioning) to 
promote firms’ compliance with accounting standards in their statutory financial 
statements.”  They found their accounting enforcement index had significant incremental 
explanatory power in predicting analyst forecast errors and dispersion when more general 
enforcement proxies were also included in the model. However, their studies did not 
explore the association between country characteristics and variation in accounting 
enforcement efforts across countries.  This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. 
This study uses BPT (2014) sample of 51 countries for the year 2008.  Although 
BPT (2014) used three separate years (2002, 2005 and 2008) in their study, the 
enforcement indices for each year are very highly correlated (with the correlations 
exceeding .8).  This paper focuses on BPT’s data for 2008, which captures the most up-
to-date information and immediately precedes the financial crisis.  Given that national 
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characteristics such as culture and religion are unlikely to change, the model presented in 
this study may have broad applicability to understanding the prospects of other 
globalization efforts. 
The BPT (2014) data on accounting enforcement was collected from national 
security regulators’ data sets about enforcement efforts.  Countries scored between a 0 
and 2 with respect to 6 dimensions of enforcement.    The dimensions of enforcement 
include  whether (a) there are regulators or monitors over financial reporting and 
financial markets, (b) said monitor has the power to set accounting and auditing 
standards, (c) the monitor reviews financial statements, (d) the monitor provides a report 
about such a review, (e) the monitor has taken enforcement action for any financial 
statements, and (f) the level of resourcing of the enforcement effort (based on the number 
of staff employed by the monitor or regulator).   
 The complete data set was available for 42 of the 51 BPT (2014) nations. Table 1 
identifies the countries used.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Research Model  
 The model tested is: 
ENFORCE2008= b1(Individualism) + b2(Power Distance) 
+b3(UncertaintyAvoidance) + b4(FactionalizedElites) +b5(Prot_Pct) 
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+b6(Buddh_Pct) +b7(Islam_Pct)+b8(Hindu_Pct)+b9(Relg_Oth)  
+b10(ReligionImportant) 
+ b11(Legal) +b12(Market_Liquidity) + e 
 
The dependent variable, ENFORCE2008, is the 2008 accounting enforcement 
index developed in BPT (2014).  Main variables of interest include culture, religious 
affiliations, religiosity and factionalized elites. Following previous studies (e.g. Duong et 
al. 2016, Han et al. 2010), Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are used to measure each 
country’s cultural values. Hofstede’s cultural values are the most widely used measures 
of national culture.9 Following the same literature, Individualism (IND), Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UA) and Power Distance (PD) are used as the main cultural variables relating 
to regulations and enforcement.  Hofstede culture data was drawn from   http://geert-
hofstede.com/dimensions.html.   
To measure the political environment and frangibility of the states, Factionalized 
Elites scores published by The Fund for Peace are used 
(http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/c2/).10 Religious affiliation data, by nation, were 
                                                 
9 Aside then from the widespread use of Hofstede’s measures, even the oft -posited alternative, House et 
al.’s (2004) measure is in itself ‘broadly consistent’ with Hofstede’s own findings (for similar concordance 
of Hofstede measure-based results with House et al.’s (2004) measure-based results, see Ashraf, Zheng and 
Arshad (2016)). Further, as Hooghiemstra, Hermes and Emanuels (2015, p. 365) state, Hofstede’s measures 
“are the most widely used measures of national culture and have produced a widely accepted, well defined, 
empirically based terminology to characterize culture.”  Even if House et al.’s  (2004) GLOBE measure 
were equal in quality to that of Hofstede (e.g., an assertion which Voss,2012, finds incorrect)  the very 
widespread use of Hofstede’s measure provides researchers the ability to better understand how the current 
research fits in with the vast array of other research out there.   
10 Of the alternative indicators of national dysfunction developed by the Fund for Peace, e.g., security 
apparatus, group grievances, state legitimacy, the factionalization of the elite variable seems best to reflect 
the authors’ concerns that the regulatory apparatus over accounting might be a so -called political football, 
in that its functioning or lack of same may give an advantage to one elite faction as opposed to another.  
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taken from Mensah’s (2014) Table 10, page 281.  It measures the percentage of the 
population professing the following religions: Protestant Christian (coded as 
PROT_PCT), Roman Catholic/Orthodox (all varieties) and Coptic (coded as 
CHRST_OTH), Buddhist (coded as BUDDH_PCT), Islamic (all branches—coded as 
ISLAM_PCT), and Hindu (coded as HINDU_PCT). All other religions, atheist beliefs, 
and no religions were classified (coded) in RELG_OTH (the residual percentage).   
Mensah (2014) obtained the data on the “distribution of religious faith” from sources 
such as the Pew Foundation, Wikipedia.com, CIA Factbook, specific country Internet 
websites and general web searches.  The importance of religion (religiosity) data were 
obtained from global Gallup Poll research, found at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx 
(Gallup.com, 8/31/2010).  
Market liquidity was used as a control variable because a desired feature of a 
well-functioning capital market is market liquidity. Previous studies have shown the 
strong link between market liquidity and quality financial reporting (e.g. Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991). Greater regulatory enforcement should provide the reassurance to 
investors (domestic and foreign) that their investments will be safe, that the information 
disclosed to them about their investments is more likely to be accurate. Christensen, Hail 
and Leuz (2013) show that the increased market liquidity was attributed to the concurrent 
enforcement changes of financial reporting in those countries, such as the creation of 
enforcement bodies supervising compliance with IFRS, instead of existing strong legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
The variable is a measure of the brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It is also true that the 
factionalized elites variable was extremely highly correlated with the other Fund for Peace variables, with 
the correlations ranging from a low of .754 to a high of .910.   
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system or financial market regulations. Market liquidity is controlled too, therefore, since 
previous studies have found that nations whose markets are more developed and better 
functioning have a better regulatory apparatus and enforcement mechanism (e.g. La Porta 
et al, 2006). Hence, it is important to control for market liquidity in assessing the impact 
of our test variables on accounting enforcement. We also used Legal system (common 
law versus code law country origins) because literature (e.g., La Porta et al.,1998) focuses 
on whether a country is setup with a common law or code law legal system. Studies have 
repeatedly found that common law systems are better for investor protections. This could 
mean that countries with common law legal systems will have stronger accounting 
regulatory enforcement efforts because of these protections. However, it could also lead 
to weaker enforcement efforts of accounting regulation because the legal system itself is 
setup to help provide an atmosphere of compliance. It seemed, therefore, important to 
control for legal system too. Further, BPT (2014) found that Enforcement scores are 
significantly higher in common law countries. Here, LEGAL is set as 1 denoting a 
common law country and 0 denoting a code law country. The variables used, their 
definitions and the sources are presented in Table 2. The descriptive statistics for these 
variables are presented in Table 3 Panel A.   
Table 3 Panel B shows the comparison of the mean ENFORCE2008 variable 
values for countries by various criterion variables. The medians of the data are used as 
the criterion for cultural dimensions, religiosity, factionalized elites and market liquidity 
variables to calculate the average accounting enforcement scores above and below the 
median. For religion variables, this study compares the means of the accounting 
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enforcement scores among countries with greater than 50% of the population said to be of 
a particular faith. For the control variable legal systems, this study calculates and 
compares the means of accounting enforcement scores for countries with common law 
systems vs. those with code law systems.   
The result shows that the mean Enforcement score is 17.14 for countries whose 
IND scores are above the median (i.e. individualistic countries) vs. 8.62 for those whose 
IND scores are below the median (i.e. collectivistic countries). Using the median Power 
Distance score as the criterion, the mean enforcement score is 16.1 for low Power 
Distance (Lo-PD) countries, versus 9.67 for high Power Distance (Hi-PD) countries. In 
the same vein, the mean enforcement score for low Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 
countries is higher than the one for high UA countries, 15.9 vs. 9.85. Taken together, the 
result shows that countries that are more individualistic, having lower power distance and 
lower uncertainty avoidance have stronger accounting enforcement on average.  
For religion variables, this paper finds that countries with the majority Protestant 
Christian populations and those whose population does not have a majority religion, or 
with religion other than the five major religions, or being primarily atheists have the 
highest mean accounting enforcement scores, 17.29 and 20.14 respectively. The number 
in the parentheses indicates the number of countries in that group. The result also reveals 
that accounting enforcement scores are lower on average for countries with a high degree 
of religiosity, that is where religion is considered more important, with an enforcement 
score of 9.76, compared to the mean enforcement score of 16 for countries where religion 
is considered less important.     
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As for countries with factionalized elites, the mean enforcement score is 10.48, 
versus an enforcement score of 15.29 for countries that are more politically coherent, i.e., 
less factionalized. In addition, for control variables, it is found that the accounting 
enforcement score is higher for countries with common law system and well-functioning 
capital markets (measured as market liquidity), as expected 
   The multivariate analysis is described next.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Research Method and Statistical Analysis 
Before running the model, following Mensah (2014), the CHRST_OTH variable 
is excluded to avoid the multicollinearity problem that would arise using it since the sum 
of the religious adherence variables in the model would otherwise sum to 100. The initial 
results indicated that although the model had a significant adjusted r-squared of .40, the 
only term in the model showing significance was the constant. In addition, an inspection 
of the correlation matrix (see Table 4) reveals a pattern of high correlations amongst the 
study variables.  While a formal multicollinearity statistic might not demonstrate a 
problem, such high correlations are a concern since some regression coefficients might 
have their significance levels altered due to the high correlations. Given that there are 
only 42 cases with 12 independent variables, the output statistics might be suspect since 
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there are only 3.5 cases per independent variable (Draper and Smith 1998; Babyak 2004).  
Accordingly, principal component analysis, a data reduction technique, was employed to 
explore whether the variables reflected underlying latent variables that in themselves are 
meaningful in achieving the research objectives.  This use of data reduction techniques is 
consistent with Ali and Hwang (2000) who noted that variables within a country tend to 
be very highly correlated, rendering the use of individual variables in a regression 
problematic.   
______________________________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________________________________________ 
The principal components factor analysis resulted in the generation of three 
factors.  The resulting three components or factors were then rotated using the Varimax 
rotation scheme.  An orthogonal rotation scheme was used in order to generate factors 
that themselves were uncorrelated with the other factors.  Using uncorrelated factors 
eases the interpretation of the factors uncovered.  In order to ascertain, though, whether 
the forced orthogonality affected the results, Direct Oblimin rotation was also performed.  
It does not force the results to be orthogonal. The results are qualitatively similar.  
 Factor scores were generated by the SPSS factor analysis routine, using the 
regression method, and saved to the database.11  Rummel (1970) notes that factor scores 
should be interpreted just as any data for any variable is interpreted.  He notes, for 
                                                 
11 SPSS v. 21 provides three alternative means to generate factor scores:  regression, Bartlett, and 
Anderson-Rubin.  Each has advantages and disadvantages, as summarized in DiStefano et al. (2009).  The 
regressions were run using factor scores generated by all three methods.  There were no meaningful 
quantitative or qualitative differences unearthed.  Therefor the results are presented using the SPSS default 
regression method of generating factor scores. 
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example, that population is a “composite of population subgroups.” Rummel goes on to 
note that the resulting composite variables are useful in other analyses, including 
regression analyses.  Unlike other variables, Rummel notes, the phenomena are highly 
interrelated.  This notion, of course, is consistent with Ali and Hwang’s (2000) 
justification for the use of principal factor analysis in their study. Appendix A provides a 
more detailed explanation of our use of principal components analysis and factor score 
regression 
 It is customary to choose a loading level for ‘admitting’ variables into 
interpretation.  In this exploratory study, the authors interpret each of the three 
components and the relationship of the variables with the component based on the factor 
that the variable loaded most highly on, with .3 being the minimally acceptable loading.  
 The rotated factor loadings are presented in Table 5.  Panel A presents the 
eigenvalues of each factor and the variance in all the variables which is accounted for by 
that factor. The rotated factor loadings, which measure the correlation between the 
original variables and the factors, are presented in Panel B. Rotated Factor 1 is most 
highly loaded upon by variables including Prot_PCT, PD, IND and FactionalizedElites. It 
captures the difference between nations that are highly unequal, with combative—
fractious or factionalized—elites that are less likely to have high percentages of 
Protestant confessants, are less individualistic, and have less liquid markets.  Therefore, it 
is labelled FractiousPD. Rotated Factor 2, denoted as Religiosity, is most highly loaded 
upon by ReligionImportant, ISLAM_PCT and OTHER_RELG. It captures the difference 
between nations that differ in perceived religion’s importance and in adherence to the 
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Islamic faith.  Rotated Factor 3, loaded upon most highly by LEGAL and UA, is labeled 
as  LawandUA.  It reflects divisions between countries that follow the common law 
versus civic code and are less likely to be Uncertainty Avoidant.  The Hindu_Pct variable 
loaded most highly on this third rotated factor, but only marginally so.12  
 With these interpretations in hand, the factor scores were entered into a multiple 
regression routine, allowing generation of the association between the factor scores and 
accounting enforcement (ENFORCE2008).  The regression results are discussed in the 
next section.    
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
Discussion of Results 
 The results of regressing ENFORCE2008 on the factors or component scores are 
presented in Table 6. Given that there were only three component variables in the 
regression and a sample size of 42, there were 14 observations for each variable in the 
regression, above the often cited need for at least 10 observations per variable in a 
regression (e.g., Draper and Smith 1998; Babyak 2004).   This supports the validity of the 
findings reported. Further, the model r-squared was .503, with the adjusted r-squared 
value being .463.  The model itself was significant at the p<.01 level, with the F-value 
                                                 
12 These are the interpretations of the factors based on the variables included. 
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being 12.802.  There were no multicollinearity issues, an expected result given that the 
factor scores extracted were orthogonal.  Although the variables of interest were 
presented singly in the hypotheses, the model to test the hypotheses singly could not be 
interpreted due to multicollinearity concerns and the overfitting of the model.  Therefore, 
the component scores and the items that loaded most strongly on these components are 
interpreted to ascertain support for the hypotheses.  
 The hypotheses represent broad categories of national culture, political 
environment, religion and religious importance.  At least one variable belonging to each 
of these broad categories loaded highly on at least one component and the factor scores 
generated were used as variables in the regression equation.  All three of the resultant 
independent component variables proved significant predictors of accounting 
enforcement efforts.  Therefore, all hypotheses were accepted at least at the level of .10.  
The following discussion of the results references the independent variables created 
through the factor analysis. 
 The regression results show that the coefficient on FractiousPD variable was 
negative (-.517) and significant at the p<.01 level.   The Religiosity variable was negative 
(-.428) and significant at the p<.01 level as well.  The LawandUA variable was positive 
(.229) and marginally significant at the p=.053 level.  In order to determine the 
incremental contribution of each factor score variable to the variance of the dependent 
variable, ENFORCE2008, each variable was entered one at a time into the regression 
equation in descending order of eigenvalues, an index of the strength of the component 
(Table 5 Panel A).  FractiousPD accounted for 26.7% of variance in ENFORCE2008.  
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Religiosity accounted for an additional 18.3% of variance in ENFORCE2008.  Finally, 
LawandUA accounted for a further 5.2% of variance in ENFORCE2008 (not tabulated).13   
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The results show that the most important set of variables in accounting for 
national accounting regulatory choices was the cultural and political setting in which the 
standard setting occurred.  Religion plays an important role as well. The FractiousPD 
component was significantly and negatively associated with accounting enforcement at 
the p<.01 level.  It is most highly loaded upon by variables including Prot_PCT (-.852), 
PD (.809), IND (-.777) and Factionalizedelites (.628). The numbers in the parentheses 
shows the correlation between the variables and the factor. Combined with the sign on 
the FractiousPD factor, the result indicates that countries ranked high in Individualism 
and low in Power Distance have stronger accounting enforcement activities. This is 
consistent with the finding of Hofstede et al. (2010) that countries with high 
Individualism scores prefer more rules. These settings also happened to be more likely to 
be Protestant, as evidenced by the negative loading of the variable on the FractiousPD 
component.  
Further, we can also state that the result shows that in national settings 
characterized by fractious elites—essentially (peacefully) warring political/economic 
                                                 
13 Please note that the proportion of variance accounted for numbers were rounded, accounting for the 
difference between the total variance accounted for of the model of 50.3% and the summed variance 
accounted for of the three individual components of 50.2%. 
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classes, strong accounting regulatory efforts were less likely.   With respect to the 
hypotheses, therefore, control variable market liquidity is loaded most highly on the 
FractiousPD component, but with a negative loading, market liquidity was therefore 
positively related to accounting enforcement, consistent with previous studies.  
Therefore, the hypotheses on cultural variables IND (Hypothesis 1) and Power Distance 
(Hypothesis 2), on political variable FactionalizedElites (Hypothesis 4), and on religious 
affiliation (Hypothesis 5), were accepted. These results, even by themselves, bear out the 
suspicion that nations are more like syndromes than symptoms, that the confluence of 
different elements collectively determines the level of accounting enforcement efforts. 
The underlying relation here may be that more “Westernized” nations with greater 
commitment to interpersonal equality living in less contentious political and economic 
environments (at least insofar as national elites are concerned) are more likely to have 
stronger accounting regulation and better functioning markets as measured here by 
market liquidity. 
 The results with respect to the second factor score-derived variable, Religiosity, 
show it was significantly and negatively related to the dependent variable accounting 
enforcement at the p<.01 level. With respect to the Religiosity component, the highest 
loading variable was RELG_OTH, which loaded negatively on the component. This 
shows that RELG_OTH is positively associated with accounting enforcement. 
ISLAM_PCT on the other hand loaded positively on the second component, indicating 
that it is negatively associated with accounting enforcement. The conjunction of these 
two religious variables, loading in opposite directions on the Religiosity Component, 
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suggest that religious identification is highly associated with accounting enforcement 
efforts.  Having a religious identification therefore is not enough to support a statement 
that religious identification is associated with greater accounting enforcement.  Instead, 
the identity of the particular religion or religious identification needs to be taken into 
account. Therefore, the finding on religion with the second component supports the 
acceptance of Hypothesis 5. The positive loading of the ReligionImportant variable on 
the Religiosity Component and the latter’s negative relationship to the dependent variable 
suggests that religious importance reduces the presence of strong accounting 
enforcement, accepting Hypothesis 6.     
Given that Mensah’s (2014) RELG_OTH variable consisted of a hodgepodge of 
smaller religions and those who did not belong to any religion or were atheists, the 
Religiosity factor score-generated variable seems to capture the importance of religious 
adherence.  Religion serves an important role in providing guidance to correct behavior, 
to setting a sense of community solidarity, and orienting one’s thoughts about one’s place 
in the universe, and how one might behave to be ‘right’ with it.  The Religiosity 
component’s negative relationship to ENFORCE2008 seems to indicate that as religious 
importance grows in the constituent nations of the sample, there is a negative association 
with accounting enforcement regulation.  It may be, therefore, that a strongly felt 
religious devotion itself may be considered sufficient to guide behavior.  This is an 
important finding because it suggests that the longterm growth in secular (non-religious) 
proportions of the population around the globe will weaken the expected influence of 
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religion on behavior. Thus, as the binding power of religion on  behavior, to the extent 
that it exists, weakens, there will be pressures for greater growth of the regulatory state.14 
The third and final factor score-derived variable, LawandUA, was positively 
associated with ENFORCE2008 at less than the p<.1 significance level.  The LawandUA 
composite variable was created from a component which is most highly loaded with 
variables LEGAL code (.834), UA (-.722) and BUDDH_PCT (.620).15  That the resulting 
factor score variable was positively associated with ENFORCE2008 indicates that nations 
with common law codes were associated with having stronger accounting regulation.  
This result is consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) who found that common law countries 
had better investor protections than did civil code countries.   
This finding suggests that common law country status is associated with stronger 
accounting regulation, a result consistent with BPT (2014).  These results also show that 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)was negatively loaded on the third component, a component 
whose factor score was positively-related to accounting regulation, accepting Hypothesis 
3.  This suggests that higher UA countries had less tough accounting regulation.   In the 
instance, this seems strange.  Would greater regulation not protect the investor better, and 
therefore diminish some of the uncertainty that investors would face in the markets?  
Perhaps, but stronger regulation betokens as well stronger governments and the actions of 
governments themselves may be considered threats.  As previously noted, original source 
                                                 
14 For evidence on trends in religious observance around the world, see 
http://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/why -do-l evels-of-religious-observance-vary-by-age-and-
country/. 
15 The difference in factor loadings of BUDDH_PCT on the third factor, upon which it has a .62 loading, 
and BUDDH_PCT’s loading on the first factor, upon which it had a .52 loading, led us to drop it from 
consideration in naming the factor since the difference in the loadings between the two factors was just 
.092. Thus, there was but a piddling difference in loadings between the two factors, rendering interpretation 
of the variable difficult, given the opposite effect of the first and the third component on ENFORCE2008. 
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unknown, the government that can give you anything you want has the power to take 
away anything you have, and since personal control of others is unlikely, such a situation 
may be more threatening than lack of control. Therefore, people in low UA countries are 
more tolerant of the change brought forth by regulatory changes if they believe such 
change is necessary. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 This research was undertaken to explore the association between nationa l cultural 
elements, religious adherence choices and importance and political coherence (as marked 
by the factionalized elites variable) on national choices of accounting enforcement. In 
effect, this study tests a model of whether national characteristics are associated with 
accounting-related enforcement efforts.  These results demonstrate the fruitfulness of 
investigating nation-level constructs in cross-national accounting research.  
This study has demonstrated the importance of cultural, religious, political, legal 
and finance-related (market liquidity) factors in affecting national accounting regulatory 
efforts.  In doing so, it adds a necessary corrective to discussions that focus on the words 
that set out the structure of a regulatory enforcement regime while ignoring the context 
within which such enforcement regimes take place.  The importance of understanding 
such context is highlighted by recent anti-globalization trends (e.g., Summers 2016). It is 
important to note that the effects reported here occurred despite the existence of 
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difference-flattening organizations such as the European Union. Of the 42 nations in the 
active sample (nations without an asterisk next to their names in Table 1), 20 are 
members of the European Union. The fact that religion and national culture still played 
an important part in predicting levels of regulation argues for the continuing relevance of 
national characteristics in determining national behavior, even when nations are part of a 
supranational economic and political entity that has its own regulatory, judicial and 
political institutions that can make binding decisions for the membership. Such a finding 
is of particular importance when international news gathering organizations frequently 
report on the truculence of nations (e.g., Poland in the Summer of 2018) with respect to 
the (in Poland’s case judiciary-related) rules of the larger entity (European Union) of 
which they are apart. These findings suggest the need for further research into the 
effectiveness of international agencies and institutions in binding the constituent nations’ 
behaviors. This finer analysis was not a goal in this study, but should be pursued in a 
variety of areas, within accounting and outside it. Given the importance of transnational 
capital flows, studies of national characteristics and the effectiveness of crossnational 
regulation of financial investments and behavior seem appropriate. 
This study does have the limitation of a small sample size, but much international 
accounting literature bears the burden of small sample sizes (e.g., Nabar and Boonlert-U-
Thai 2007; Richardson 2007; Kleinman and Lin, 2017). That said, the nations in the BPT 
(2014) study do include major and medium economic powers, therefore the variables 
developed in their research are important ones to study.  Future research should 
ACCOUNTING ENFORCEMENT’S DETERMINANTS—A GLOBAL STUDY                  43 
 
  
 
investigate the dynamic changes of accounting enforcement across time and regions of 
the world.  
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Table 1  Nations Used in BPT (2014) 
Argentina* Korea (South)* 
Australia Malaysia 
Austria Mexico 
Belgium Morocco 
Brazil Netherlands 
Canada New Zealand 
Chile Norway 
China Pakistan 
Croatia Peru 
Czech Republic* Philippines* 
Denmark Poland 
Egypt  Portugal 
Finland Romania* 
France Russia 
Germany Singapore 
Greece Slovenia 
Hong Kong* South Africa 
Hungary Spain 
India Sweden 
Indonesia Switzerland 
Ireland Taiwan* 
Israel* Thailand 
Italy Turkey 
Japan Ukraine* 
Jordan United Kingdom 
 United States 
*Data availability problems led to the exclusion of asterisked (*) nations from the 
sample. 
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Table 2 Definitions of Variables 
Name and Symbol  Measure 
ACCOUNTING 
ENFORCEMENT 
(ENFORCE2008) 
The sum of accounting-related enforcement 
measures, as calculated and reported on in BPT  
(2014).  The constituent elements are defined in the 
text itself. 
INDIVIDUAL (IND) 
Measure of Individualism/Collectivism.  The higher 
the score on this measure, the greater the societal 
preference for individual self care-taking and 
responsibilities. Hofstede culture data (IND, PD and 
UA) were drawn from http://geert-
hofstede.com/dimensions.html 
 
POWER DISTANCE (PD) 
Measure of Power Distance. The higher the PD 
score, the more the less powerful members of a 
society accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally.  
UNCERTAINTY 
AVOIDANCE (UA) 
Measure of Uncertainty Avoidance.  Greater scores 
indicate a higher desire to avoid uncertainty and 
ambiguity.  
 
 
 
FACTIONALIZED 
ELITES 
This measure of the fragility of states was obtained 
from http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2008-
sortable 
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LEGAL 
Measure of legal origin.  It is set to 1 if nation is  
common law and 0 if a civil code nation, following 
Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2014).  
PROT_PCT 
Measures the percentage of the population of the 
Protestant faith. Mensah’s data covers the years 
2000 to 2012.  He makes the assumption that the 
population percentages of a given faith are stable 
over time.  
CHRISTIAN_OTH 
(CHRST_OTH) 
Measures the percentage of the population that are 
of Christian faith but not Protestant. Based on 
Mensah (2014). 
HINDU_PCT 
Measures the percentage of the population 
reportedly of the Hindu faith.  Based on Mensah 
(2014). 
BUDDH_PCT 
Measures the percentage of the population 
reportedly of the Buddhist faith.  Based on Mensah 
(2014). 
ISLAM_PCT 
Measures the percentage of the population 
reportedly of the Islamic faith.  Based on Mensah 
(2014). 
RELG_OTH 
Measures the percentage of the population said to 
profess a religion other than described above, or not 
professing a religion. Based on Mensah (2014). 
RELIGIONIMPORTANT 
The importance of religion data was taken from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-
highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx 
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MARKETLIQUIDITY 
Market liquidity is the average total value of stocks 
traded as a percentage of GDP for the period 2005 to 
2008 (e.g. La Porta et al. 2006). Source: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSe
lection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators 
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Table 3 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N =42) 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
25% Median 75% 
ENFORCE2008 12.88 6.425 8.000 12.000 19.000 
IND 50.90 24.286 27.000 49.500 71.750 
PD 55.45 20.800 35.750 61.500 70.000 
FACTIONALIZEDELITES 4.295 2.588 1.800 3.950 6.725 
UA 64.64 23.465 48.000 66.500 86.000 
LEGAL 0.31 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PROT_PCT 20.57 29.006 0.775 4.875 35.858 
BUDDH_PCT 6.50 18.644 0.100 0.290 1.025 
ISLAM_PCT 17.77 32.712 0.875 3.550 8.550 
HINDU_PCT 2.42 12.397 0.000 0.075 0.520 
RELG_OTH 16.40 15.884 1.208 12.555 24.435 
RELIGIONIMPORTANT 57.71 27.989 32.750 60.000 83.750 
MARKETLIQUIDITY 74.97 66.429 22.394 54.844 115.500 
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Table 3 
Panel B:  Comparison of Mean Accounting Enforcement Scores for 2008 by Various Criterion Variables  
       
Criterion Cultural Dimensions      
Median Hi-IND Lo-IND Lo-PD Hi-PD Lo-UA Hi-UA 
ENFORCE2008 17.14 8.62 16.1 9.67 15.9 9.85 
 Religions      
>50% Populations 
except * 
PROT_PCT (7) 
CHRST_OTH 
(17) 
HINDU_PCT (1) 
BUDH_PCT 
(3) 
ISLAM_PCT 
(7) 
RELG_OTH 
(7)* 
ENFORCE2008 17.29 11.06 6 10.67 7.57 20.14 
 Religiosity      
Median High Low     
ENFORCE2008 9.76 16     
 Factionalized Elites      
Median Politically Coherent 
Politically 
Divided     
ENFORCE2008 15.29 10.48     
 CONTROLS      
 Common Law (13) 
Code Law 
(29) High Market Liquidity Low Market Liquidity  
ENFORCE2008 15.08 11.9 15.86 9.9   
* Note that the following nations did not have a majority of population professing the five major religions and are  included  Relg_OTH: China, 
Netherland, Belgium, New Zealand, Germany, Austria and Canada. 
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Table 4 Correlations 
 ENFORCE 
2008 IND PD 
Factionalized 
Elites UA LEGAL 
PROT 
_PCT BUDDH_PCT 
ISLAM_PC
T 
HINDU 
_PCT 
RELG 
_OTH 
Religion 
Important 
IND 
.679**            
PD 
-.463** -.702**           
Factionalized 
Elites 
-.456** -.585** .638**          
UA 
-.371* -.242 .305* .127         
LEGAL 
.232 .164 -.120 .064 -.483**        
PROT_PCT 
.477** .587** -.671** -.517** -.510** .091       
BUDDH_PCT 
-.021 -.334* .219 .270 -.194 .401** -.209      
ISLAM_PCT 
-.412** -.428** .354* .606** .004 -.039 -.309* -.078     
HINDU_PCT 
-.152 -.036 .189 .167 -.212 .277 -.110 -.016 .009    
RELG_OTH 
.397** .379* -.228 -.401** -.002 .007 .077 .079 -.444** -.171   
RELIGION 
IMPORTANT 
-.554** -.592** .501** .636** .208 .083 -.500** .043 .608** .143 -.721**  
MARKET 
LIQUIDITY 
.505** .455** -.357* -.219 -.420** .280 .489** .062 -.142 -.005 .224 -.350* 
**two-sided significance below 1% level * two-sided significance below 5% level 
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Table 5 Principal Component Analysis 
Panel A Total Variance Explained  
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sum of Squared Loadings 
Componen
t 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
1 4.449 37.076 37.076 4.449 37.076 37.076 
2 2.047 17.057 54.133 2.047 17.057 54.133 
3 1.480 12.33 66.463 1.480 12.33 66.463 
4 1.021 8.507 74.970    
5 0.753 6.276 81.246    
Panel A Total Variance Explained (Cont’d) 
 Rotated Sum of Squared Loadings 
Componen
t 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
1 3.365 28.038 28.038 
2 2.578 21.485 49.523 
3 2.033 16.940 66.463 
Panel B Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 
PROT_PCT -.852 -.107 .165 
PD .809 .258 -.027 
IND -.777 -.351 .041 
Factionalizedelites .628 .534 .188 
MarketLiquidity -.500 -.174 .460 
RELG_OTH -.050 -.855 -.012 
ReligionImportant .453 .786 .018 
ISLAM_PCT .234 .748 .005 
LEGAL -.041 -.009 .834 
UA .438 -.064 -.722 
BUDDH_PCT .528 -.298 .620 
HINDU_PCT .050 .247 .395 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Table 6 Regression Results 
 
ENFORCE2008= b1(FractiousPD) + b2(ReligImport) +b3(LawandUA)  + e 
 
ENFORCE2008 
Coefficient t-value 
(Constant) 12.881 17.737*** 
FractiousPD -.517 -4.520*** 
ReligImport -.428 -3.738*** 
LawandUA .229 2.001* 
F 12.802*** 
 
Adjusted R2 0.463 
 
R-Squared 0.503 
 
***p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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Appendix A 
This appendix describes how we addressed the methodological issues presented by 
having a limited data set—although a respectably-sized one for international research 
using nation states as the observation units, and highly correlated variables (see Ali and 
Hwang, 2000).   The number of variables in our data set, even in the absence of 
multicollinearity, may result in overfitting of the model. Babyak (2004; p. 411) defines 
overfitting as “asking too much from the data.”  He goes on to say that, “Given a certain 
number of observations in a data set, there is an upper limit to the complexity of the 
model that can be derived with any acceptable degree of uncertainty. Complexity arises 
as a function of the number of degrees of freedom expended (the number of predictors 
including complex terms such as interactions and nonlinear terms) against the same data 
set during any stage of the data analysis.”  The problem with this, he notes, is that 
“findings” that appear in an overfitted model don’t really exist in the population and 
hence will not replicate.” Given, as Babyak (2004) notes, that if “you put enough 
predictors in a model you will get a result that is impressive, but lacks substance”, we 
chose to use a data reduction routine.  Absent that routine, our initial results showed an 
adjusted r-squared of .40, with only the constant term in the model showing significance.  
Given that we only have 42 cases with 12 independent variables, our output statistics 
might be suspect.   
Draper and Smith (1998; see also Babyak, 2004) state that there should be 10 
observations for each independent variable, something that may also be true in principal 
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components analysis.16 In this regression, that is not possible since we only have a 
complete set of data on 42 nations, thus we only have 3.5 observations per independent 
variable.  In addition, an inspection of the correlation matrix (see Table 4) reveals a 
pattern of high correlations amongst study variables.  While a formal multicollinearity 
statistic might not demonstrate a problem, such high correlations are a concern since 
some regression coefficients might have their significance levels altered due to the high 
correlations. Accordingly, we employed data reduction techniques to explore whether the 
variables reflected underlying latent variables that in themselves are meaningful in terms 
of our research objectives.  Our use of data reduction techniques is consistent with Ali 
and Hwang (2000) who also employed it in their study of government versus private 
standard setting in 16 countries.  Ali and Hwang (2000) noted that variables within a 
country tend to be very highly correlated, rendering the use of individual variables in a 
regression problematic.  Preliminary analyses of our data indicate that Ali and Hwang’s 
(2000) concerns hold true here as well.   
Di Stefano, Zhu and Mindrila (2009,  page 1) note that exploratory factor analysis 
may be used “for a variety of purposes such as reducing a large number of items to a 
smaller number of components, uncovering latent dimensions underlying a data set, or 
examining which items have the strongest association with a given factor.” Rummel 
(1970) sees several uses for factor analysis.  These include (a) interdependency and 
pattern identification; (b) parsimony or data reduction; (c) uncovering the basic structure 
                                                 
16 For example, please see statistics.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/output/principal_components.htm.. 
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of a domain; (d) scaling; (d) data transformation; (e) mapping and (f) hypothesis testing. 
We clearly are interested in data reduction, as noted above.  Given the high 
intercorrelation of many of our variables, it is also important to use factor analysis to 
uncover the underlying structure of the domain we explore.  Uncovering the basic 
structure of the domain(s) involved is also important to provide greater insight into the 
environments that give rise to greater or lesser regulation. Thus the use of factor analysis 
helps generate rich insight into, and resources to derive from, the varied environments 
within which regulation may occur.  Further, given that the process of generating the 
factor structure also gives rise to the ability to generate factor loadings, the output of the 
factor analysis enables us to see how different countries load on the different factors 
found if we wish.  We also can, and will, use the resultant factor scores to test the 
hypotheses developed earlier in the paper.  While the variables do not exist in isolation, 
as presented in the hypotheses, the loadings of each variable on the factors enable us to 
see which factor the variables are most highly correlated with. The different facets that 
describe a nation are more like syndromes than individual symptoms and the value of 
exploratory factor analysis to the researcher is that he/she can explore how collections of 
symptoms (a.k.a., syndromes) affect the research questions of interest.  In a way, then, 
the use of factor scores provides a more realistic look at the forces that affect regulatory 
effort than does the use of variables in a regression alone. 
The data reduction technique that we used was Factor Analysis with a principal 
components extraction.  The scree plot indicated that we had three factors or components.  
Using all the variables listed, we found that we had a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
ACCOUNTING ENFORCEMENT’S DETERMINANTS—A GLOBAL STUDY                  62 
 
  
 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy of .49. We dropped the CHRST_OTH variable from the 
factor analysis and found that the KMO measure increased to .78. This measure varies 
between 0 and 1, and values closer to 1 are better. We chose CHRST_OTH to drop first 
because our earlier attempts to conduct a regression analysis of the data showed that, of 
the religion variables, its presence in the regression equation alone triggered a VIF score 
much greater than 10, a typically-cited threshold for multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2000).  
A KMO measure of .6 is considered the minimal threshold (see 
http://statistics.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/output/principal_components.htm), therefore the 
results of the factor analysis that included the other variables but not CHRST_OTH was 
deemed acceptable.  The three extracted components accounted for 66.5% of total 
variance.  The first component accounted for 37.1% of total variance, the second 
component accounted for an additional 17.1% of total variance, and the third component 
accounted for 12.3% of total variance.  In addition, Bartlett's test of sphericity rejects the 
null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix (p<.01).  Rejection of 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity is important in accepting the results of the factor analysis 
threshold (see http://statistics.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/output/principal_components.htm). 
These results indicate the validity of the three factors, and related factor scores, 
generated. 
 
 
